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Clubs,	Parties,	Factions		Charles	Walton	Reader,	University	of	Warwick	Abstract:	Historical	debate	over	the	political	clubs	of	the	French	Revolution	over	the	past	two	centuries	has	turned	on	the	question	of	whether	factionalism	grew	out	of	their	democratic	principles	or	from	external	circumstances.	This	chapter	suggests	that	neither	ideology	nor	circumstances	can	fully	account	for	this	radicalisation.	Instead,	the	conditions	of	a		‘weak	state’	must	be	addressed.	When	authorities	were	unable	or	unwilling	to	implement	legislation	or	to	respond	to	demands	coming	from	society,	the	clubs	often	intervened,	militating	for	action	to	be	taken.	Tax	collection	and	the	crisis	of	subsistence	constituted	two	crucial	issues	that	the	state	failed	to	managed.	The	clubs,	which	were	divided	on	these	issues,	found	themselves	debating	them	in	a	context	in	which	no	legal	limits	on	slander	(another	state	weakness)	existed.	Unchecked	calumny	poisoned	intra	and	inter-club	relations	and	contributed	to	factionalism.		Keywords:	Subsistence,	Taxes,	Freedom	of	Expression,	Calumny,	Honour,	Terror,	Free	Markets		 What	role	did	political	clubs	play	in	the	French	Revolution?	Were	they	engines	of	democratization	and	social	justice	or	seedbeds	of	factionalism	and	terror?		Views	on	the	clubs	have	divided	historians	ever	since	the	early	nineteenth	century.		In	her	Considerations	on	the	Principal	Events	of	the	French	
Revolution,	Mme	de	Stael	demonized	the	most	influential	of	clubs,	the	Jacobins:	‘The	dreadful	sect	of	Jacobins	pretended	to	found	liberty	on	despotism,	and	from	that	system	arose	all	the	crimes	of	the	Revolution.’1	A	few	decades	later,	Jules	Michelet	cast	the	clubs	in	a	more	favourable	light.	He	attributed	their	emergence	across	France	in	1789	and	1790	to	political	crisis:	‘[They]	grew	out	of	the	situation	itself,	from	the	most	imperious	necessity,	that	of	public	safety’.	He	also																																																									1	Staël,	Anne-Louise-Germaine	Necker,	Baroness	de,	Considerations	on	the	
Principal	Events	of	the	French	Revolution,	Duke	de	Broglie	and	Baron	de	Staël	(eds.),	2	vols.	(New	York,	1818),	vol.	1,	176-177.	
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stressed	the	‘genius’	of	the	Paris	Cordeliers	Club	for	its	‘popular	reason’	and	concern	for	the	working	classes.	2	Conflicting	views	on	French	revolutionary	clubs	persisted	over	the	next	two	centuries.		At	the	turn	of	the	twentieth,	Augustin	Cochin	attributed	the	Revolution’s	‘terrorist	legislation’	to	the	clubs,	which	he	saw	as	growing	out	of	the	late	Old	Regime’s	‘sociétés	de	pensée’	(salons,	circles,	clubs,	literary	associations).	He	echoed	Alexis	de	Tocqueville’s	criticism	that	revolutionaries	were	driven	to	excess	by	their	philosophical	zeal,	or	what	de	Tocqueville	referred	to	as	their	‘abstract	literary	politics’,	but	he	developed	it	along	sociological	lines:	Commitments	to	egalitarianism	and	political	unanimity,	largely	inspired	by	the	writings	of	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	led	the	clubs	to	impose	a	pre-manufactured	‘general	will’	and	to	denounce	or	expel	anyone	who	disagreed	with	it.	This	dynamic,	already	present	in	the	clubs	of	the	early	Revolution,	gradually	seeped	into	revolutionary	politics	more	generally,	with	calamitous	consequences.	Between	August	1793	and	August	1794,	‘Rousseau’s	idea,	direct	democracy,	achieves	its	realisation;	it	is	the	year	of	the	Terror.’3		In	the	1970s,	François	Furet	drew	heavily	from	de	Tocqueville	and	Cochin	in	analysing	Jacobinism.	He	saw	early	revolutionary	commitments	to	democratic	equality	and	collective	sovereignty	as	generative	of	paranoia,	denunciations	and	purges.	Although	Jacobin	clubs	initially	supported	constitutional	monarchy	and	tended	to	limit	membership	to	elites	(membership	fees	were	high),	their	high-minded	principles	of	equality	and	moral	regeneration	unwittingly	drove	them	towards	the	Terror.	Cochin	and	Furet’s	critiques	of	the	Jacobin	clubs	chimed	with	conservative	and	liberal	views	of	the	Revolution:	Cochin	was	a	devout	Catholic,	sympathised	with	the	counterrevolution	and	greatly	admired	Hippolyte	Taine,	an	influential	conservative	historian	of	the	late	nineteenth	century.	For	his	part,	Furet	was	inspired	by	liberalism,	especially	in	the	vein	of	Madame	de	Staël	and	Benjamin	Constant,	whom	Furet	sought	to	resurrect	in	French	Revolutionary	historiography.																																																										2	Jules	Michelet,	Histoire	de	la	Révolution	française,	9	vols.	(Paris,	n.d.),	vol.	2,	240,	281-282.	3	Augustin	Cochin,	La	Révolution	et	la	Libre-pensée:	la	socialisation	de	la	pensée-
1750-1789;	la	socialisation	de	la	personne	–	1789-1792;	la	socialisation	des	biens	–	
1793-1794	(Paris,	1979),	201.	
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Republican	and	Marxist	views	on	the	revolutionary	clubs	were	more	sympathetic.	After	publishing	several	volumes	of	the	minutes	of	the	Paris	Jacobin	Club’s	meetings,	Alphonse	Aulard,	writing	in	the	1890s,	concluded	that	the	club	was	not	ideologically	inflexible,	as	often	claimed.	The	club	was	willing	to	‘bend	to	circumstances’	and	‘reflected	the	vicissitudes	of	public	sentiment’.	True,	Jacobins	may	have	been	naive	in	seeking	to	spread	republican	principles	across	Europe,	he	conceded,	but	their	zealous	pedantry	should	not	deprive	them	of	the	credit	due	to	them	for	being,	in	politics,	‘the	first	primary	school	instructors		of	France’.4	More	recently,	Raymonde	Monnier,	seeking	to	nuance	Albert	Soboul’s	‘class’	interpretation	of	popular	politics,	argues	that	the	clubs	played	a	crucial	role	in	developing	‘democratic	public	space’.	Factionalism,	she	argues,	had	less	to	do	with	class	or	egalitarian	ideology	than	with	tensions	between	Paris	and	the	surrounding	countryside	over	grain	and	general	fears	over	subsistence.5	Ideology	and	circumstances,	then,	are	the	two	principal	lines	of	interpretation	for	factionalism	in	French	Revolutionary	politics.	This	essay	will	introduce	an	alternative	thesis:	namely,	the	weak	state.	The	conditions	generated	by	it	radicalised	the	discourse	and	actions	of	the	clubs.	But	before	re-examining	the	sources	of	factionalism	in	the	clubs,	it	is	worth	reviewing,	first,	the	clubs’	origins	and	the	kinds	that	existed	(they	were	not	all	Jacobin);	second,	what	the	clubs	actually	did	and	not	just	what	they	professed	(actions	cannot	be	reduced	to	ideas);	and	finally,	the	political	context	in	which	the	political	clubs	evolved	(‘weak	state’	conditions,	which	radicalized	civil	society).		
The	Origins	and	Rise	of	Revolutionary	Clubs	One	of	the	earliest	revolutionary	clubs,	or	circles,	of	1789	was	the	Club	de	Valois.	Co-founded	by	the	abbé	Sieyès	on	11	February	1789,	the	club	met	in	the	Palais-Royal	under	the	sponsorship	of	the	duc	d’Orléans,	cousin	(and	purported	rival)	of	Louis	XVI.	It	counted	more	than	six	hundred	members.	Many	were	of	noble	origins,	robe	and	sword,	which	is	ironic	given	that	Sieyès	published	What	is	the																																																									4	Aulard,	Le	Club	des	Jacobins	sous	la	monarchie,	La	Révolution	française	22:	2	(July-Dec,	1892),	122.	5	Albert	Soboul,	The	Parisian	Sans-culottes	and	the	French	Revolution,	1793-94	(Oxford,	1964);	Raymonde	Monnier,	L’Espace	public	démocratique:	Essai	sur	
l’Opinion	à	Paris	de	la	Révolution	au	Directoire	(Paris,	1994).	
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Third	Estate?	at	the	time	of	the	club’s	founding.	Members	came	from	the	haute	bourgeoisie	as	well,	and	included	financiers	and	wholesale	merchants	(négociants).	Short-lived,	the	Club	de	Valois	was	quite	contentious,	and	clashes	escalated	not	infrequently	into	duels.6	Members	would	go	on	to	span	the	political	spectrum	in	later	years,	joining	the	Jacobins	(left,	centre-left),	the	Feuillants	(constitutional	monarchs	who	split	off	from	the	Jacobin	Club)	or	the	Club	monarchique	(right,	centre-right).		Most	historical	accounts	of	the	revolutionary	clubs	begin	with	the	Breton	Club,	which	formed	during	the	Meeting	of	the	Estates	General	began	in	early	May	1789.	Spearheaded	by	a	group	of	third	estate	deputies	from	Brittany,	the	club	met	regularly	at	a	café	in	Versailles	over	the	summer	to	strategize.	It	folded	when	the	National	Constituent	Assembly	followed	the	king	to	Paris	in	October,	but	the	following	month	several	of	its	former	members	founded	the	Société	de	la	
Révolution,	named	after	a	London	club	which	publicly	sympathized	with	the	reforms	of	the	French	Revolution.	In	January	1790,	the	club	changed	its	name	to	the	Société	des	amis	de	la	Constitution	and	rented	space	in	a	Jacobin	convent	on	the	rue	Saint	Honoré,	near	the	National	Assembly	hall	–	hence	their	more	familiar	name,	the	Jacobin	Club.	Initially	liberal	and	selective,	the	club	would	become	more	democratic	and	republican	after	July	1791,	when	a	factional	split	and	defection	of	members	committed	to	constitutional	monarchy,	a	split	sparked	by	dramatic	events	(the	royal	family’s	attempt	to	flee	France	in	late	June	and	the	fusillade	of	patriots	in	July),	forced	the	Jacobins	to	seek	the	support	of	commoner	and	poor	sectors	of	the	population.	Political	clubs	proliferated	throughout	France	in	1789	and	1790.	Many	grew	out	of,	or	followed	the	traditions	of,	late	Old	Regime	voluntary	associations:	freemasonry	clubs,	Mesmerist	harmony	societies,	philanthropic	societies,	and		reading	salons.	Provincial	clubs	often	sought	affiliation	with	the	Jacobin	Club	in	Paris,	which	offered	benefits.		Affiliation	provided	access	to	influential	national	deputies	and	to	news	about	legislation	and	events	taking	place	in	the	capital.	It	also	conferred	legitimacy,	which	was	important	in	a	legal	climate	in	which	voluntary	associations	were	at	the	mercy	of	municipal	authorities,	which	had																																																									6	Augustin	Challamel,	Les	clubs	contre-révolutionnaires:	Cercles,	Comités,	Sociétés,	
Salons,	Réunions,	Restaurants	et	Librairies	(Paris,	1895),	32.	
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been	given	vast	legal	powers	to	maintain	public	order	in	1789.		Although	the	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man	and	of	the	Citizen	did	not	grant	the	right	of	association,	a	decree	passed	on	14	December	1789	extended	this	right	in	a	limited	way	to	active	citizens,	that	is,	males	over	twenty-five	years	of	age	who	paid	the	equivalent	of	three	days’	wages	of	an	unskilled	worker	in	taxes	and	who	were	deemed	neither	bankrupt	nor	insolvent.	The	decree	required	club	meetings	to	be	approved	by	municipal	authorities	and	to	be	limited	to	the	drafting	of	addresses	and	petitions,	deputations	for	which	could	not	exceed	ten	citizens.7	Several	municipalities	tried	to	restrict	and	suppress	the	Jacobin	clubs,	especially	in	areas	with	intense	opposition	to	the	Revolution’s	religious	policies,	which	the	Jacobin	clubs	supported	(expropriation	of	Church	property	and	the	ecclesiastical	oath	to	the	constitution	that	all	clerics	were	required	to	swear).	Seeking	to	strengthen	local	support	for	these	reforms,	the	National	Assembly	passed	a	more	liberal	decree	on	13	November	1790,	extending	‘the	freedom	to	assemble	peaceably	and	to	form	free	societies’	to	all	citizens,	active	and	passive	(the	question	of	gender	was	not	addressed).	Over	the	next	three	months,	the	number	of	cities	with	clubs	affiliated	with	the	Paris	Jacobins	nearly	doubled,	from	213	to	427.8	Several	cities	had	more	than	one	patriotic	club.	Some	of	the	newer	clubs	grew	out	of	factional	splits	in	the	established	ones;	others	out	of	out	of	class	dynamics:	Many	could	not	afford	the	high	membership	fees	of	the	elite	clubs.	In	Nîmes,	for	example,	the	bourgeois	patriot	club	charged	24	livres.	The	rival	popular	club,	on	the	other	hand,	charged	only	6	livres,	payable	in	three	instalments.9	Although	tensions	existed	between	competing	local	clubs	in	some	towns	and	cities,	in	many	cases,	pro-revolutionary	clubs	managed	to	co-exist	peacefully.	Sometimes	they	established	alliances	or	fused.		Provincial	patriot	clubs	expanded	dramatically	in	the	early	years	of	the	Revolution.	Although	not	all	provincial	clubs	were	affiliated	with	the	Paris	Jacobins,	the	increase	in	the	number	of	cities	with	affiliations	to	the	mother	club																																																									7	Mavidal	et	al.	(eds.),	Archives	parlementaires	de	1787	à	1860:	Recueil	complet	
des	débats	législatifs	et	politiques	des	Chambres	françaises	(Paris:,	1867)	[hereafter	AP],	vol.	10,	567.	8	Kennedy,	The	Jacobin	Clubs	in	the	French	Revolution:	The	First	Years,	Appendix	B,	362.	9	Claude	Mazauric,	‘Jacobins/Jacobinisme’	in	Albert	Soboul	(ed.),	Dictionnaire	
historique	de	la	Révolution	française	(Paris,	1989),	586.	
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provides	a	general	sense	of	growth	rates:	from	20	cities	with	affiliations	in	January	1790	to	921	by	July	1791.10	Representatives-on-mission,	sent	by	the	National	Convention	into	the	provinces	in	1793,	frequently	founded	patriotic	clubs	in	(mostly	rural)	areas	where	enthusiasm	for	the	Revolution	was	weak	and	contributions	to	the	war	effort	minimal	or	nil.	In	this	radical	phase	(1793-1794),	some	clubs	became	de	facto	branches	of	administration.	They	collaborated	intimately	with	local	comités	révolutionnaires	and	comités	de	surveillance	and	became	the	arms	through	which	the	representatives-on-mission	imposed	emergency	measures.11	In	places	where	local	officials	were	lax	or	inactive,	the	clubs	might	take	control,	with	the	blessing	of	the	representative-on-mission.	By	the	start	of	the	Year	II	(September	1793),	in	towns	that	had	a	club,	local	officials	were	likely	to	be	club	members.	In	Bayeux,	for	example,	the	local	club	declared,	after	a	purge	of	the	local	administration,	‘Henceforth,	the	municipality	and	the	club	will	be	one-in-the-same.’12		After	9	September	1793,	the	National	Convention	sought	to	curtail	sans-culotte	militancy	in	the	Paris	sections	by	passing	a	decree	limiting	meetings	to	twice	per	week	(they	had	been	meeting	en	permanence).	To	sweeten	this	bitter	pill,	the	Convention	called	for	paying	the	poor	two	livres	to	attend	each	of	these	bi-weekly	meetings,	as	a	means	of	extending	social	assistance.	Circumventing	these	restrictions,	sectional	militants	founded	popular	societies	in	the	fall	of	1793.	In	the	late	spring	and	summer	of	1794	(even	before	9	Thermidor	and	the	fall	of	the	robespierristes),	the	sectional	clubs	began	closing,	for	a	variety	of	reasons:	exhaustion	with	factionalism,	but	above	all,	pressure	and	manipulation	on	the	part	of	the	Jacobin	Club	and	the	government	(especially	the	Committees	of	General	Security	and	of	Public	Safety,	themselves	at	odds	with	each	other).	Clubs	were	abolished	by	the	decree	of	6	Fructidor	Year	III	(23	August	1795),	but	they	resurfaced	clandestinely	during	the	Directory.	One	finds	neo-Jacobins	meeting	in	Paris	in	the	lead-up	to	the	Fructidor	coup	of	the	Year	V	and	across	France	in	the	
																																																								10	Kennedy,	The	Jacobin	Clubs:	The	Early	Years,	Appendix	B,	362.	11	Michel	Biard,	Missionnaires	de	la	République	(Paris,	2002),	esp.	ch.	5.	12	Michael	L.	Kennedy,	The	Jacobin	Clubs	in	the	French	Revolution,	1793-1795	(New	York,	2000),	53-77,	for	quote,	see	66.	
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months	prior	to	the	Brumaire	coup	of	1799,	which	brought	Napoleon	to	power.13	Counterrevolutionary	clubs	re-emerged	as	well,	most	notably,	the	Club	de	Clichy	in	Paris.14	Napoleon’s	prefectures,	which	were	established	in	February	1800	and	given	vast	policing	powers,	stifled	all	significant	club	activity	until	1814.	Anti	and	counterrevolutionary	clubs,	often	overlooked	by	historians,	also	emerged	in	the	early	years	of	the	Revolution.15	Little	is	known	about	these	fleeting	associations,	but	according	to	Paul	R.	Hanson,	they	existed	in	at	least	thirty-five	towns	and	cities	across	France,	including	large	ones	like	Paris,	Bordeaux,	Aix-en-Provence,	La	Rochelle,	Strasbourg	and	Toulouse.16	Like	their	radical	counterparts,	the	royalist	clubs	were	prone	to	paranoia,	denunciations	and	violence.	Though	staunchly	in	favour	of	patriarchal	authority,	they	shared	with	their	Jacobin	rivals	the	belief	that	particular	interests	should	be	subordinated	to	the	general	interest.	In	the	preamble	to	its	prospectus,	the	monarchical	club	in	Limoges	expressed	its	aversion	to	all	‘private	associations’.	The	short-lived	Club	des	Impartiaux	in	1790,	and	subsequently,	the	Club	monarchique,	both	founded	in	Paris	by	centre-right	deputies	of	the	Constituent	Assembly,	mounted	a	relentless	libel	campaign	against	the	Jacobins.	Like	their	adversaries,	the	Club	monarchique	sought	and	secured	provincial	affiliations.		Local	royalist	clubs	often	clashed	with	the	patriotic	societies,	sometimes	violently.	In	December	1790,	members	of	the	royalist	Club	des	amis	de	la	paix	in	Aix-en-Provence	insulted	and	shot	members	of	Aix’s	two	patriotic	clubs,	killing	one	and	wounding	several	others	in	front	of	a	royalist	café	(the	club’s	meeting	place)	on	the	Cours	Mirabeau.	The	popular	clubs	forced	authorities	to	hand	over	two	detained	suspects	deemed	responsible	for	the	violence.	After	tracking	down	a	third	(the	instigator),	the	popular	clubs	hanged	all	three	men	near	the	site	of	the	shootings.	This	was	an	extreme	case.	Still,	tensions	between	pro	and	anti-
																																																								13	Isser	Woloch,	Jacobin	Legacy:	The	Democratic	Movement	under	the	Directory	(Princeton,	1970);	Bernard	Gainot,	1799,	un	nouveau	Jacobinisme?	(Paris,	2001).	14	Challamel,	Les	clubs	contre-révolutionnaires,	483-506.	15	In	addition	to	Challamel,	see	Robert	Griffiths,	Le	Centre	perdu:	Malouet	et	les	
"monarchiens"	dans	la	Revolution	franpaise	(Grenoble:	1988).	16	Paul	Hanson,	‘Monarchist	Clubs	and	the	Pamphlet	Debate	over	Political	Legitimacy	in	the	Early	Years	of	the	French	Revolution’,	French	Historical	Studies	21:	2	(Spring	1998),	301.	
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revolutionary	clubs	ran	high	in	several	towns,	exacerbated	by	a	polarized	press	in	which	royalist	and	patriot	journalists	relentlessly	demonised	each	other.17			
Social	Composition	and	Actions	The	social	composition	of	revolutionary	clubs	varied	greatly.	Some	Jacobin	clubs	were	dominated	by	liberal	nobles	and	high	bourgeoisie;	others,	by	professionals,	retail	merchants	and	artisans.	The	question	of	women’s	inclusion	in	the	Jacobin	clubs	was	much	debated	in	the	early	years	of	the	Revolution.		When	women	were	admitted,	they	tended	to	be	confined	to	a	certain	area	of	the	meeting	hall	and	forbidden	to	address	the	club	or	talk	to	the	male	members.	Their	presence,	often	justified	on	the	grounds	that	women	needed	education,	sometimes	caused	tensions.	Women	forged	their	own	clubs	and	circles,	occasionally	securing	‘auxiliary’	status	with	the	local	Jacobin	club.	Such	circles	proliferated	in	early	1791	but	were	generally	non-political	and	devoted	to	reading	newspapers	and	preparing	revolutionary	festivals.	One	club,	the	Société	des	citoyennes	
républicaines	révolutionnaires,	founded	in	Paris	in	May	1793,	was	notably	different,	professing	a	militant	patriotism	that	led	to	street	clashes	with	more	moderate	women.	The	Convention	banned	it	in	September,	at	a	time	when	deputies	were	seeking	to	curb	popular	militancy	more	generally.	A	month	later,	on	30	October,	it	banned	all	women’s	clubs.18	Political	clubs	took	up	many	activities.	They	lobbied,	often	for	local	economic	interests,	and	electioneered.	They	communicated	with	other	clubs	to	coordinate	positions	on	important	political	matters,	most	notably	the	constitution.	At	a	time	when	Church-run	schools	were	closing	(the	result	of	expropriations),	Jacobins	took	it	as	their	duty	to	offer	public	instruction.	Given	the	collapse	of	tax	collection,	the	clubs	often	spurred	citizens	to	make	voluntary	gifts	and	contributions	to	the	nation.	They	opened	‘souscriptions’	for	various	charitable	causes	as	well.	They	became	so	effective	at	charity	drives	that	in	1793	
																																																								17	Hanson,	‘Monarchist	Clubs’,	299-324.	18	Dominique	Godineau,	The	Women	of	Paris	and	Their	French	Revolution	(Berkeley,	1998);	Jean-Clément	Martin,	La	Révolte	brisée:	Femmes	dans	la	
Révolution	française	et	l'Empire	(Paris,	2008);	Olwen	Hufton,	Women	and	the	
Limits	of	Citizenship	in	the	French	Revolution	(Toronto,	1992).	
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and	1794,	local	administrations	often	conferred	the	management	of	public	charity	to	them.		Although	the	creation	of	paper	money	(the	assignats)	helped	the	government	meet	expenses	in	the	Revolution’s	early	years,	by	1793,	lack	of	tax	revenues	and	depreciation	of	the	assignats	led	to	a	raft	of	decrees	urgently	calling	for	the	collection	of	current	taxes,	arrears	and	forced	loans.	Local	clubs	often	took	the	lead	in	collecting	these	sums.	They	also	took	public	stances	with	regard	to	subsistence	crises:	initially	supportive	of	market	freedom	in	the	grain	trade,	most	clubs	changed	their	minds	by	1793	and	1794	and	became	militant	about	the	surveillance	of	commodity	stocks	and	price	ceilings.	The	abrupt	return	to	liberal	economic	policies	of	the	Thermidorian	Convention	and	Directory	was	accompanied	by	the	abolition	of	the	clubs	(August	1795).	Meanwhile,	many	of	the	club	leaders	of	the	Year	II	who	had	had	played	an	active	role	in	the	economic	‘terror’	were	persecuted	in	the	Year	III,	by	crowds	but	also	by	officials.19		
Club	radicalisation:	ideology	or	‘weak-state’	conditions?	How	did	the	pro-revolutionary	clubs	of	the	French	Revolution,	which	proclaimed	to	promote	freedom,	equality	and	fraternity,	end	up	in	deadly	faction-fighting	by	the	Year	II?		We	have	already	noted	how	François	Furet	and	his	followers	drew	inspiration	from	Cochin	and	de	Tocqueville,	who	saw	in	the		clubs	the	seeds	of	authoritarianism	and	terror.	Versions	of	this	interpretation	follow	intellectual	and	sociological	lines.	According	to	Keith	M.	Baker	and	Mona	Ozouf,	Jacobin	commitments	to	absolute	collective	sovereignty	and	moral	regeneration	undermined	whatever	liberal	potential	the	Revolution	may	have	had.20	They	argue	that	revolutionaries	inherited	from	the	Old	Regime	(and	Rousseau)	illiberal,	absolutist	conceptions	of	sovereignty	and	an	aversion	to	pluralist																																																									19	Stephen	Clay,	‘Vengeance,	Justice	and	the	Reactions	in	the	Revolutionary	Midi’,	
French	History	23:1	(2009),	22-46;	Howard	G.	Brown,	Ending	the	French	
Revolution:	Violence,	Justice,	and	Repression	from	the	Terror	to	Napoleon	(Charlottesville,	2006).			20	Keith	M.	Baker,	Inventing	the	French	Revolution:	Essays	on	French	Political	
Culture	in	the	Eighteenth	Century	(Cambridge,	1990),	esp.	chapter	8;	Mona	Ozouf,	‘Public	Opinion'	at	the	End	of	the	Old	Regime’,	Journal	of	Modern	History	60,	Supplement	9	(1998),	S1-S21;	and	Ozouf,	‘Public	Spirit’	in	Furet	and	Ozouf	(eds.),	
Critical	Dictionary	of	the	French	Revolution	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1989),	771-780.	
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notions	of	public	opinion,	which	they	took	to	be	divisive	and	anarchic.	Contemporaries	believed	that	moral	tutelage	was	needed	to	rein	diverse	opinions	into	a	rational	consensus	oriented	towards	the	general	interest.	Jacobins,	Baker	argues,	were	allergic	to	the	English	model	of	party	politics,	which	they	saw	to	be	chaotic	and	destabilizing.	Indeed,	the	term	‘parti’	in	late	eighteenth-century	France	was	synonymous	with	‘faction’.	Jacobins	worried	about	the	effects	of	all	political	opposition	and	all	mediating	bodies,	which	corrupted	the	‘general	will’.	Society	was	to	be	comprised	of	virtuous	individual	citizens	and	the	state	operating	for	the	general	good.	Clusters	of	particular	interests	were	thought	to	undermine	the	new	order.			 Whereas	Baker	and	Ozouf	focussed	on	concepts	and	discourse,	Furet	emphasized	the	sociological	implications	of	commitments	to	Enlightenment	ideals.	But	in	borrowing	from	Cochin,	his	sociology	was	ultimately	idea-driven.	Other	potential	factors	driving	radicalization,	such	as	circumstances	and	counterrevolution,	were	not	only	subordinated	in	Furet’s	model;	they	were	presented	as	the	necessary	consequence	of	ideology.	For	Cochin	and	Furet,	ideology	created	its	own	circumstances	and	intensified	obsessions	with	‘counterrevolution’.	Cochin	asks,	‘Is	it	true,	as	M.	Aulard	believes,	that	circumstances	explain	all	revolutionary	laws	and	actions?	What	we	assert	is	that	the	very	idea	of	revolutionary	acts	and	laws	[...]	would	not	have	arisen	without	the	principle	of	direct	sovereignty	and	the	[kind	of]	regime	that	results	from	it:	the	social	regime.’21	(The	‘social	regime’,	for	Cochin,	was	without	hierarchical	authority	and	guided	by	abstract	principles	that	equal	citizens	were	expected	to	share.)	Like	Cochin,	Furet	drew	a	straight	line	from	democratic	sociability	and	principles	to	the	pathological	politics	of	the	Year	II:	‘The	truth	is	that	the	Terror	was	an	integral	part	of	revolutionary	ideology,	which	[...]	gave	its	own	meaning	to	“circumstances”	that	were	largely	of	its	own	making.’22	For	Furet,	ideology	produced	‘counterrevolution’	as	well.	Scarcely	a	threat	in	real	terms	(or	so	he	believed),	‘counterrevolution’	was	blown	out	of	all	proportion	by	paranoid	
																																																								21	Cochin,	Les	sociétés	de	pensée	et	la	démocratie	moderne	(Paris,	1921),	82-83.		22	François	Furet,	Interpreting	the	French	Revolution,	Elborg	Forster	(trans.)	(Cambridge,	1981	[orig.	1978]),	62.	
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Jacobins,	for	whom	any	deviation	from	the	‘general	will’	and	‘virtue’	constituted	an	existential	threat.		 The	persuasiveness	of	these	arguments	lies	in	the	way	they	are	hermetically	sealed	within	a	tight,	idea-based	logic	of	cause	and	effect.	Ideology	is	seen	as	motivating	actions,	structuring	them,	and	justifying	them.	The	way	power	explains	itself	and	the	way	it	actually	works	are	one	and	the	same.	The	argument	is	thus	circular	and	self-reinforcing:	If	one	begins	with	the	premise	that	circumstances	are	the	epiphenomena	of	ideology	(or	what	ideologically	committed	clubs	inevitably	produce),	then	one	can	dispense	with	judiciously	weighing	a	broad	range	of	factors.	Put	another	way,	if	‘abstract	literary	politics’	are	all	one	considers,	then	the	Revolution’s	tragic	course	will	perforce	appear	to	be	the	result	of	‘abstract	literary	politics’.	The	task	of	analysis	is	limited	from	the	outset	to	tracking	down	the	ideas	most	responsible	for	the	tragedy:	collective	sovereignty,	representation,	moral	regeneration,	perpetual	peace,	natural	law.			The	ideological	determinism	implicit	in	the	Furetian	model	has	been	challenged	in	recent	decades.	Often,	though,	historians	simply	reject	the	thesis	and	go	on	to	tell	an	alternative	story	in	which	‘circumstances’	or	‘counterrevolution’	are	stressed.	Political	theorist	Jean	Cohen,	however,	offers	a	critique	of	the	Furetian	thesis	that	engages	closely	with	its	terms.	She	concedes	that	discourses	of	popular	sovereignty	and	representation	are	ultimately	‘fictions’	and	‘carry	the	risk	that	dictatorial	or	oligarchic	elites	will	deploy	them	to	legitimate	their	authoritarian	and	self-interested	forms	of	rule’,	but	she	insists	that	they	are	‘necessary	fictions’.	Their	‘philosophical	and	sociological	indeterminacy’,	she	argues,	‘are	precisely	what	permit	critique,	questioning,	reflexivity	and	creativity	on	the	institutional	and	theoretical	levels,	in	the	unending	quest	to	make	institutions	more	just,	more	egalitarian,	more	open,	more	responsive,	more	accountable,	more	responsible	–	that	is,	democracy	itself.’23	Democratic	principles	can	be	used	in	different	ways,	positive	and	negative,	and	therefore	cannot	be	assumed	to	have	only	one	(negative)	set	of	implications.		
																																																								23	Jean	Cohen,	‘The	Self-Institution	of	Society	and	Representative	Government:	Can	the	Circle	be	Squared?’,	Thesis	Eleven,	80	(February	2005),	24.	
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	 Cohen	moves	us	beyond	ideological	determinism	but	leaves	us	with	an	unresolved	question:	On	what	does	a	positive	or	negative	deployment	of	democratic	principles	depend?	Why	do	those	principles	serve	as	salutary	checks	on	state	power	in	one	context	but	lead	to	exorbitant	state	power	in	another?	The	historian	is	likely	to	turn	to	circumstances	for	answers	to	this	question,	and	indeed,	the	thesis	of	‘circumstances’	has	made	a	comeback	over	the	past	decade	or	so.	But	the	defenders	of	this	thesis	often	sidestep	rather	than	confront	Cochin	and	Furet’s	critique	of	it.	Cochin	and	Furet	insist	that	circumstances	are	sociologically	produced.	They	do	not	emerge	sui	generis,	the	accidental	concatenation	of	myriad	causes.	If	we	accept	their	sociological	inclinations	but	reject	their	tendency	to	reduce	sociology	to	ideology,	we	are	left	looking	for	an	alternative	sociological	basis	to	explain	how	circumstances	are	produced	and	how	they	inflect,	positively	or	negatively,	the	course	democratic	ideas	ultimately	take.	What	alternative	sociological	category	of	analysis	might	be	useful?		I	propose	focusing	on	what	Jean-Clément	Martin	refers	to	as	the	‘défaut	d’état’	–	the	absence	or	weakness	of	the	state.24	Weak-state	conditions,	I	argue,	radicalised	the	discourses	and	actions	of	the	revolutionary	clubs,	which	pressured	officials	to	implement	policies	and	decrees	that	those	officials	were	either	unable	or	unwilling	to	carry	out.	Rather	than	seeking	the	flaws	(ideology)	within	institutions	of	civil	society	(the	clubs)	to	explain	the	rise	of	terror	and	authoritarianism,	we	might	begin	with	the	deficiencies	of	the	state	to	explain	the	radicalisation	of	civil	society	(and	hence,	the	clubs).	These	deficiencies	were	many,	but	among	the	most	important	were	the	inability	and/or	unwillingness	to	regulate	violence,	redistribution	(tax	collection	and	public	spending),	subsistence,	and	honour.		
Violence	Inability	to	control	violence	is	arguably	the	most	important	of	the	state’s	deficiencies	during	the	early	years	of	the	French	Revolution,	when	the	Old	Regime’s	forces	of	public	order	fragmented,	collapsed	or	merged	with	new	forces.	Louis	XVI	could	not	count	on	the	army	to	put	down	revolt	in	Paris	on	14																																																									24	Jean-Clément	Martin,	Violence	et	Révolution:	essai	sur	la	naissance	d’un	mythe	
national	(Paris,	2006).	
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July	1789,	in	part	because	so	many	of	his	soldiers	defected,	joining	new	National	Guard	forces,	which	came	into	being	that	day.	New	authorities’	control	over	the	army,	navy,	bourgeois	militias,	National	Guard,	and,	in	1793,	the	popular	revolutionary	armies	(ambulatory	bands	of	sans-culottes	who	enforced	the	economic	terror	in	the	countryside)	was	also	tenuous.	This	chronic	weakness	put	society	(and,	hence,	the	clubs)	in	the	predicament	of	having	to	take	sides,	supporting	or	condemning	various	forces	and	their	sometimes	violent	actions,	such	as	the	revolts	and	mutinies	of	the	army	and	navy	in	Nancy	and	Brest	in	1790.	Coercion	and	punitive	justice	are	not	matters	that	easily	lend	themselves	to	pluralism	in	opinions.	To	consolidate	‘legitimate’	violence	in	the	state,	society	must	reach	a	relative	degree	of	consensus	on	whether	such	violence	merits	support	or	condemnation.	One	of	the	most	contentious	issues	dividing	the	Jacobins	in	autumn	1792	and	winter	1793	was	how	to	respond	to	the	September	massacres,	when	sans-culottes	spontaneously	stormed	the	prisons	of	Paris,	executing	hundreds	of	priests,	nobles	and	ordinary	criminals,	just	as	foreign	counterrevolutionary	troops	were	advancing	on	Paris.	Were	the	massacres	‘just’?	The	question	polarised	the	Jacobin	Club	and	led	to	the	expulsion	of	several	moderate	‘Girondin’	ministers	and	deputies	(Jacques	Pierre	Brissot,	Jean-Marie	Roland,	Étienne	Clavière),	who	condemned	the	massacres.			Other	deficiencies	of	the	state	helped	radicalise	society	as	well:	officials’	inability	or	unwillingness	to	collect	taxes,	secure	subsistence	and	avenge	assaults	on	honour.	These	deficiencies	often	prompted	the	clubs	to	intervene,	at	first	through	petitioning	and	denunciations,	but	eventually,	by	taking	over	local	administrative	powers.			
Taxes	and	Redistribution	Modern	states,	much	like	authorities	in	non-modern	societies,	are	redistributive.	They	procure	resources	(through	taxes,	tribute,	loans,	confiscation,	plunder)	and	redistribute	them	again	(through	patronage,	subsidies,	contracts,	charity,	pensions,	public	works,	subsistence	and	rents	on	public	debt).	While	historians	agree	that	the	Revolution’s	most	immediate	cause	was	the	Old	Regime’s	financial	crisis,	this	fact	is	often	treated	as	a	circumstantial	‘spark’	while	other	factors	(class	tensions,	public	opinion)	are	taken	to	be	the	combustible	material	for	
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more	explosive	dynamics.	This	view	limits	our	ability	to	see	how	political	legitimacy	was	bound	up	with	the	state’s	ability	to	meet	redistributive	demands,	especially	for	subsistence	and	rents	(interest	payments)	on	public	debt.		The	importance	of	redistribution	in	claiming	and	maintaining	power	was	evident	at	the	very	start	of	the	Revolution.	When	Third	Estate	deputies	broke	away	from	the	other	two	orders	(the	clergy	and	nobles)	on	17	June	1789	and	declared	themselves	to	be	the	National	Assembly,	they	immediately	asserted	their	authority	over	redistribution,	declaring	the	abolition	of	the	old	tax	regime	then	authorising	its	temporary	maintenance	until	they	completed	the	creation	of	a	new	system.	They	also	put	the	Old	Regime’s	debts	(those	of	the	monarchy	but	also	of	venal	tax	receivers	and	tax	farms,	which	had	conflated	public	and	private	debts)	under	the	assembly’s	safeguard	and	promised	to	maintain	interest	payments,	or	rents,	which	were	a	kind	of	redistribution,	on	capital	investments	in	the	debt.	Finally,	they	announced	that	they	would	investigate	the	sources	of	the	subsistence	crisis	and	devise	solutions.	In	short,	the	National	Assembly	staked	its	legitimacy	on	the	promise	to	meet	the	most	pressing	redistributive	demands	in	the	crisis	of	1789.	The	clubs	played	an	active,	if	contentious	and	controversial,	role	in	supporting,	and	at	times,	opposing	the	various	policies	adopted	to	deal	with	these	demands	over	the	next	four	years.		 Already	insufficient	to	meet	redistributive	obligations	in	1787,	tax	collection	virtually	ground	to	a	halt	in	the	chaos	of	1789.25	The	National	Assembly’s	creation	of	a	new	tax	regime	in	late	1790	and	early	1791	did	little	to	improve	the	situation.	Faced	with	the	spectre	of	default	in	1789,	the	National	Assembly	opted	to	nationalise,	then	privatise	through	auctions,	church	property.	The	terms	of	this	land	redistribution,	worked	out	contentiously	in	the	National	Assembly	over	the	winter,	spring	and	early	summer	of	1790,	met	with	widespread	opposition	in	many	parts	of	France,	especially	on	the	part	of	clerics	but	also	sectors	of	the	population.	The	clubs	played	a	crucial	role	in	bringing	about	the	relative	success	of	the	redistribution	–	success,	that	is,	in	terms	of	bringing	land	to	auctions,	not,	as	it	turned	out,	in	terms	of	eliminating	national																																																									25	For	tax	collection	during	the	French	Revolution,	see	Eugene	Nelson	White,	‘The	French	Revolution	and	the	Politics	of	Government	Finance,	1770-1815’,	Journal	
of	Economic	History	55:	2	(1995),	227-255.	
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debt.	Michael	L.	Kennedy	observes,	‘For	the	Jacobins	of	the	Constituent,	religion	was	the	number-one	issue.’26	Clubbists,	he	continues,	were	instrumental	not	only	in	protecting	Protestants	from	bigotry	but	also	in	supporting	the	confiscation	of	Church	property	to	pay	off	the	national	debt.	They	often	put	pressure	on	reluctant	or	resistance	administrators	to	auction	these	lands.	Unsurprisingly,	perhaps,	they	also	figured	prominently	among	the	buyers	of	these	biens	
nationaux.		 The	breakdown	of	tax	collection	in	1789	had	multiple	reasons:	fear	and	uncertainty	about	the	future,	of	course,	but	also	the	imminent	abolition	of	venal	tax	receiverships	and	tax	farms,	holders	of	which	now	had	little	motivation	to	enforce	a	moribund	tax	regime.	Meanwhile,	patriotic	and	popular	clubs	took	the	lead	in	voluntary	giving	to	the	state.	Such	giving	pre-dated	the	emergence	of	clubs,	and	had	already	made	a	mark	on	national	politics.	In	one	of	its	final	decrees	before	leaving	Versailles	for	Paris	with	the	royal	family	in	early	October,	the	National	Assembly,	desperate	to	reassure	creditors,	invited	taxpayers	to	make	a	one-time	voluntary	‘patriotic	contribution’	of	twenty-five	per	cent	of	one’s	annual	income	to	the	nation.	The	decree	emphasized	the	voluntary	nature	of	these	contributions	and	forbade	officials	from	forcing	citizens	to	pay.27	With	few	contribution	given	over	the	course	of	the	following	year,	however,	the	National	Assembly	resorted	to	making	the	contribution	patriotique	mandatory	in	August	1790.	The	initial	voluntary	status	of	the	contribution	prompted	the	nascent	clubs	in	many	parts	to	transform	what	might	have	been	a	legal	matter	(paying	taxes)	into	a	litmus	test	of	loyalty	and	virtue	to	the	new	regime.	They	spurred	local	citizens	to	pay	the	contribution	patriotique	over	the	next	few	years.	By	1793,	receiving	a	certificat	de	civisme,	without	which	one	might	become	a	suspect,	required	proof	of	having	paid	all	taxes	and	the	contribution	patriotique	of	1789.			 Indeed,	at	a	time	when	local	administrations	proved	to	be	incapable	or	unwilling	to	collect	sufficient	revenues	to	meet	redistributive	demands	for	social	assistance,	the	clubs	often	took	the	initiative	to	organise	charity.	They	raised																																																									26	Kennedy,	The	Jacobin	Clubs	of	the	French	Revolution:	The	First	Years,	304.	27	Charles	Walton,	‘Between	Trust	and	Terror:	Patriotic	Giving	in	the	French	Revolution’,	in	David	Andress	(ed.),	Experiencing	the	French	Revolution	(Oxford,	2013),	47-67.	
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money	to	subsidise	the	purchase	of	grain	and	distributed	bread.	In	November	1792,	the	local	club	in	the	town	of	Tarascon	(Bouches-du-Rhône)	proposed	side-stepping	the	municipality	to	organise	public	road	works.	Two	months	later,	the	club	wrote	a	terse	letter	to	local	officials	requesting	the	town	give	up	its	church	bell,	obviously	to	be	melted	down	for	metal	to	help	with	the	war	effort.28		The	rise	in	the	influence	and	power	of	the	clubs	on	the	local	level	may	well	have	stemmed	from	their	ability	to	deal	with	crucial	redistributive	demands,	especially	for	subsistence	and	war	munitions,	demands	that	local	administrations	were	often	incapable	or	unwilling	of	meeting.	There	is,	indeed,	some	evidence	of	unwillingness	on	the	part	of	officials	to	enforce	taxes	on	their	fellow	citizens.	Officials	in	Tours,	for	example,	wrote	to	other	municipalities	in	late	1790,	after	the	contribution	patriotique	had	been	made	mandatory,	explaining	how	‘odious’	it	was	to	enforce	this	tax.	They	discouraged	other	towns	from	collecting	it,	assuring	that	it	was	not	being	collected	in	Paris	and	other	cities	in	France.29			 Tax	collection	remained	weak	throughout	the	early	years	of	the	Revolution.	To	meet	expenses,	national	authorities	printed	more	assignats	(which	led	to	their	depreciation).	Exacerbating	matters,	local	authorities	often	refused	to	burn	the	assignats	used	to	purchase	biens	nationaux	(thus	taking	them	out	of	circulation,	having	fulfilled	their	function	of	swapping	public	debt	for	land)	and	applied	them	to	meeting	expenses,	such	as	wages	for	local	public	works.30	In	early	1793,	the	National	Convention	passed	a	raft	of	decrees	insisting	on	the	payment	of	current	taxes,	arrears	and	forced	loans.	The	clubs	proved	in	many	cases	to	be	more	zealous	about	enforcing	these	decrees	than	local	administrations,	which	were	often	purged	and	replaced	with	club	members.	In	Pau	in	February	1793,	a	local	club	announced	that	it	would	appoint	its	own																																																									28	Archives	départementales,	Bouches-du-Rhône,	L	1571,	Letter	of	9	November	1792	by	the	Société	des	amis	de	la	liberté	et	de	l'égalité.	29	Archives	municipales	de	Bordeaux,	G	20	‘Contributions	patriotiques’,	Letter	from	municipal	officers	in	Tours	to	those	in	Bordeaux,	no	date	(but	clearly	from	late	1790).	30	For	example,	see	the	explanation	of	district	administrators	in	Tarascon,	who	feared	insurrection	if	wages	for	public	works	were	not	paid	by	using	assignats	that	were	supposed	to	be	burned:	Archives	départementales	des	Bouches-du-Rhône,	L	1513,	‘Délibérations	et	arrêtées	Directoire	du	district	de	Tarascon’,	2	January	1793.	
	 17	
commissioners	to	knock	on	the	doors	of	all	citizens	‘and	to	note	the	names	of	all	those	who	give	[for	the	war	effort]	and	how	much	they	give,	as	well	as	[the	names]	of	those	who	refuse	to	give’,	which	must	have	struck	many	citizens	as	menacing.31	Although	historians	tend	to	focus	on	the	executions	of	the	Terror,	many	of	those	arrested	were	simply	fleeced	and	sometimes	(though	not	always)	released.	The	arrest	registers	of	the	comité	révolutionnaire	in	Nantes	1793,	full	of	radicalised	clubbists,	contain	indications	of	‘dons	patriotiques’	and	release	dates	in	the	margins.32	In	short,	the	state’s	failure	to	manage	fiscal	redistribution	–	tax	collection	and	public	spending	–	created	an	opening	for	more	determined	forces	in	society,	notably	the	clubs,	to	take	the	initiative,	bullying	citizens	into	paying	and	pressuring,	and	even	purging,	local	administrations	to	ensure	payments	were	made.		
Visible	or	invisible	hands?	The	problem	of	subsistence.		Subsistence	was	the	other	important	redistributive	demand	that	national	deputies	committed	themselves	to	meeting	on	the	day	they	seized	power	(17	June	1789).	What	role	did	the	clubs	play	in	dealing	with	the	bread	question?	At	first,	they	supported	the	liberal	economic	policies	of	the	National	Assembly.33	Although	deputies	initially	seemed	to	lean	towards	interventionist	measures	between	late	June	and	mid	August,	by	the	end	of	August,	when	they	were	completing	the	final	articles	of	the	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man	and	of	the	Citizen,	they	opted	for	‘hands-off’	policies	instead,	in	tune	with	the	most	‘advanced’	economic	thinking	of	the	era.	On	29	August	1789,	they	passed	a	decree	criminalising	market	interventions,	be	they	by	crowds	or	local	authorities.	Violations	were	to	be	treated	as	lèse-nation,	a	kind	of	treason	or	sedition,	for	which	special	jurisdictions	were	to	be	established.	While	many	local	administrations	wrote	to	the	Constituent	Assembly	to	complain	about	the	decree	and	request	its	abrogation,	Jacobin	clubs	over	the	next	year	largely	supported	it,																																																									31	Jean	Annat,	Les	sociétés	populaires	[Pau,	Nay,	Saint-Jean-de-Luz,	Lescar,	Orthez]	(Pau,	1940),	207.	32	Archives	départementales	de	Loire-Atlantique,	L	1322,	‘Comité	révolutionnaire	de	Nantes’.	33	Kennedy,	The	Jacobin	Clubs	of	the	French	Revolution:	The	First	Years,	124;	his	
The	Jacobin	Clubs	of	the	French	Revolution:	The	Middle	Years	(Princeton,	1998),	65-79;	and	his	The	Jacobin	Clubs	of	the	French	Revolution:	1793-1795,	111-129.	
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believing	that	the	self-regulating	market	was	the	most	efficient	and	equitable	means	of	distributing	grain	throughout	France.	To	the	degree	that	market	forces	were	not	yet	perfect,	clubs	were	willing	to	organise	charity.	In	Paris,	it	appears	that	the	Club	monarchique	took	the	lead	in	distributing	bread	to	the	masses	well	before	the	Jacobins.	In	1790	and	1791,	the	Jacobins	repeatedly	denounced	the	
monarchiens	in	the	National	Assembly	for	not	playing	fair,	for	seeking	to	bribe	the	population	to	support	counterrevolution.34	If	that	was	the	aim	of	the	monarchists,	their	efforts	largely	failed.	The	journalist	Jean-Baptiste	Gorsas	captured	the	cynicism	of	the	situation	in	recounting	a	verbal	exchange	in	the	faubourg	of	Saint	Marceau.	When	a	national	guardsmen	reproached	a	friend	for	accepting	such	hand-outs,	the	friend	replied,	‘Oh	well,	I	may	have	eaten	monarchist	bread,	but	when	it	comes	out	it	is	patriot	crap!’35	Throughout	the	Revolution,	the	question	of	aid	for	subsistence	often	took	the	form	of	a	debate	over	loans	or	subsidies.	Contemporaries	were	well-aware	the	difference	between	the	two.	Whereas	subsidies	drew	state	resources	away	from	the	payment	of	rents	on	public	debt,	loans	offered	the	possibility	of	turning	a	subsistence	crisis	into	a	source	of	more	rents	(interest	on	the	loan).	Both	solutions	might	resolve	the	crisis	in	the	short	term,	but	loans	ran	the	risk	of	indebting	bakers,	who	would	eventually	have	to	raise	the	price	of	bread.	One	of	the	earliest	political	causes	taken	up	by	radicals	in	the	Cordeliers	District	of	Paris,	which	would	eventually	become	a	club	when	the	city	was	carved	up	into	sections,	concerned	this	very	issue.	It	appears	that	in	early	July	1789,	Jacques	Necker,	first	minister	of	finances,	promised	subsidies	to	Jacques	Rutledge,	a	negotiator	hired	by	the	bakers	of	Paris.	When	the	Commune	of	Paris	offered	the	bakers	loans	in	October	1789,	Rutledge	encouraged	them	to	opt	for	the	subsidies	of	Necker	instead.	The	Commune	was	outraged	by	this	and	charged	Rutledge	with	lèse-nation.36	Necker	denied	having	made	such	promises	to	Rutledge	(though	traces	of	a	meeting	to	this	end	can	be	found	in	the	National	Assembly																																																									34	Challamel,	Les	clubs	contre-révolutionnaires,	164.	See	also	Réponse	de	M.	
Malouet	à	la	dénonciation	du	club	de	la	constitution	monarchique,	par.	M.	Barnave	in	Archives	nationales	de	France,	AD	XVIIIc,	no.	12.		35	Hanson,	‘Monarchist	Clubs’,	313.	36	For	details	on	this	affair,	see	A.	Tuetey,	Répertoire	général	des	sources	manuscrites	de	l'histoire	de	Paris	pendant	la	Révolution	française	(Paris:	Imprimerie	nouvelle,	1890),	entries	1177-1204.	
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minutes	for	early	July).37	Journalists	associated	with	the	Cordelier	District,	Camille	Desmoulins	and	Jean-Paul	Marat,	publicized	the	affair	widely,	condemning	the	Commune	and	Necker	while	vigorously	supporting	the	imprisoned	Rutledge	(he	would	be	released),	presenting	him	as	a	martyr.	Rutledge	would	go	on	to	became	a	radical	figure	in	the	Cordelier	Club	over	the	next	three	years.	The	transition	among	Jacobin	clubs	from	supporting	the	self-regulation	of	grain	markets	to	supporting	government	regulation	and	official	price	ceilings	in	1793	provoked	much	debate	and	controversy.	Many	clubs	were	indecisive	about	which	course	of	action	to	support.	The	club	in	Pau,	for	example,	repeatedly	flip-flopped	on	the	issue	in	1793,	taking	bold	stances	each	time.	On	17	May,	members	petitioned	the	department	to	enforce	the	4	May	decree	placing	a	maximum	price	on	bread.	When	the	department	failed	to	respond,	the	club	sent	a	deputation	in	early	June.	It	is	not	clear	what	happened	in	the	meeting	with	departmental	officials,	but	by	July,	the	club	was	touting	the	virtues	of	the	free	market.	Members	even	discussed	sending	a	deputation	to	the	National	Convention	to	request	the	abrogation	of	the	maximum.	By	October,	however,	they	had	changed	their	minds	yet	again	(the	National	Convention	had	passed	a	more	robust	law	regarding	the	‘maximum’	in	late	September)	and	were	pressuring	the	municipality	to	enforce	price-ceilings	on	commodities	that	had	not	yet	been	regulated.	They	repeated	the	demand	in	February	1794.38	The	subsistence	question	divided	the	Paris	Jacobin	Club,	which	was	increasingly	influenced	by	the	social	agendas	of	the	Cordeliers	Club	and	popular	subsistence	demands.	Although	most	Jacobins	subscribed	to	liberal	economic	principles,	when	Jean-Marie	Roland,	a	Jacobin,	began	enforcing	free	grain	markets	as	minister	of	the	interior	in	1792,	his	adversaries	in	the	club	(Robespierre,	Marat)	exploited	the	unpopularity	of	his	liberal	policies.39	Tensions	in	Paris	over	how	the	government	should	regulate	food	commodities	–																																																									37AP,	vol.	8,	207,	‘Extrait	du	registre’,	6	July	1789.		38	Annat,	Les	sociétés	populaires,	197-198.		39	For	the	political	tensions	over	Roland’s	economic	policies,	see	Charles	Walton,	‘Les	graines	de	la	discorde:	Print,	Public	Spirit	and	Free-market	Politics	in	the	French	Revolution’,	in	Charles	Walton	(ed.),	Into	Print:	Limits	and	Legacies	of	the	
Enlightenment.	Essays	in	Honor	of	Robert	Darnton	(University	Park,	2011),	158-174.	
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or	if	it	should	regulate	them	–	soon	exacerbated	those	in	the	provinces.	While	Roland	sent	repeated	instructions	to	the	local	administrations	and	clubs	to	take	the	lead	in	educating	the	masses	about	the	benefits	of	the	free	market,	the	Jacobin	Club	denounced	Roland’s	policies	in	its	regular	correspondence	with	its	affiliates.		In	the	summer	of	1793,	after	the	passage	of	the	first	maximum	law	of	4	May	1793,	the	new	Jacobin	minister	of	the	interior,	Dominique-Joseph	Garat,	discreetly	circulated	translated	copies	of	Adam	Smith’s	The	Wealth	of	Nations	among	his	itinerant	agents,	instructing	them	to	draw	on	its	wisdom	in	drafting	observation	reports.40	In	the	midst	of	the	sans-culotte	ascendancy	of	1793,	it	was	wise	not	to	tout	free-market	principles	publicly.	Still,	those	principles	were	shaping	government	views	and	objectives.	Once	the	Jacobin	Club	and	government	committees	managed	to	curtail	the	influence	of	the	radical	movement	in	the	spring	and	summer	of	1794,	however,	economic	liberal	policies	started	making	a	comeback	(the	lifting	of	the	maximum,	then	of	all	regulation	concerning	subsistence	in	1795),	which	angered	and	disillusioned	many	Jacobin	supporters	of	the	sectional	clubs.		How	do	controversies	over	subsistence	support	the	‘défaut	d’état’	thesis?	The	absence	of	state,	I	have	argued,	stemmed	not	only	from	the	inability	but	also	from	the	unwillingness	of	officials	to	meet	certain	redistributive	demands.	Although	the	bread	crisis	is	usually	treated	as	an	‘economic’	issue	by	historians,	for	contemporaries	it	was	profoundly	political.	The	liberal	economic	commitments	of	early	revolutionaries	weakened	the	bonds	between	society	and	the	state	and	radicalised	redistributive	demands	by	trying	to	de-politicise	them.	Economic	liberals	sought	to	redirect	demands	for	bread	to	the	self-regulating	market,	a	space	beyond	politics	and	administration.	The	clubs,	however,	were	the	only	mediating	bodies	left	on	the	political	scene	after	the	(Jacobin-inspired)	abolition	of	the	guilds,	corporations,	chambers	of	commerce	and	government	regulatory	bureaus	in	1791.	Deprived	of	alternative	institutions	for	their	expression	(and	even	collective	petitions	were	banned	in	1791),	economic	
																																																								40	Archives	nationales	de	France,	F1a	551,	dossier	‘Franqueville’,	in	Walton,	‘Les	
graines	de	la	discorde’.	170.	
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demands	worked	their	way	into	the	clubs,	which	increasingly	militated	for	the	re-regulation	of	the	economy,	and	especially	subsistence.		Arguably,	then,	if	the	Jacobin	clubs	can	be	faulted	for	being	naive	and	utopian	about	anything,	it	was	their	early	faith	in	the	myth	of	the	self-regulating	market.	In	his	The	Great	Transformation,	Karl	Polanyi	argues	that	attempts	to	create	a	society	based	on	self-regulating	markets	has	been	historically	destabilizing.41	Although	he	does	not	seek	to	explain	the	French	Revolution,	his	model	is	useful	for	understanding	the	passions	and	tensions	to	which	debates	over	political	economy	gave	rise	at	that	time.	Analysing	the	efforts	to	realise	the	self-regulating	markets	in	other	periods	of	modern	history,	he	concludes	that	the	greater	the	efforts	are	to	remove	economic	demands	from	the	sphere	of	politics	(and	economic	liberals	during	the	Revolution	tried	to	do	so	by	criminalising	interventions	in	grain	markets	and	abolishing	socio-economic	mediating	bodies),	the	more	likely	it	is	that	those	demands	will	storm	back	into	politics	with	a	vengeance.	The	form	those	frustrated	demands	take	depends	on	the	circumstances,	but	he	believes	that	it	is	likely	to	be	illiberal.	The	clubs	of	the	French	Revolution	clearly	served	as	the	conduits	in	this	process,	which	Polanyi	refers	to	as	a	‘double	movement’:	liberalisation	produces	political	frustration,	which	produces	radical	demands	for	re-regulation.	Clearly,	the	‘défaut	d’état’	in	regulating	subsistence	between	1789	and	1793	–	the	effort	to	replace	moral	economy	with	political	economy	–	contributed	to	dividing	and	radicalising	the	clubs.		
Free	speech	and	the	culture	of	calumny	and	honour	The	Revolution’s	‘weak-state’	conditions	extended	not	only	over	problems	of	violence,	taxes	and	markets.	It	also	extended	over	the	problem	of	free	expression.	Revolutionaries	struggled	to	reconcile	this	freedom,	proclaimed	in	the	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man	and	of	the	Citizen	of	August	1789,	with	the	protection	of	honour.	In	demanding	the	freedom	of	the	press	throughout	France	on	the	eve	of	the	Meeting	of	the	Estates	General,	most	French	cahiers	de	
doléances	(formal	demands	for	reforms	drafted	by	the	three	orders	throughout																																																									41	Karl	Polanyi,	The	Great	Transformation:	the	political	and	economic	origins	of	
our	time	(Beacon	Hill,	1957	[orig.	1944]).		
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France)	also	called	for	the	punishment	of	abusive	expression,	such	as	insults,	libel	and	calumny.42	The	advent	of	free	speech	hardly	altered	people’s	concern	for	honour,	which	was	central	to	social	life.	Honour	had	important	social,	political	and	economic	implications.	Access	to	patronage,	credit,	marriage	opportunities,	offices	and	jobs	all	depended	on	honour.	The	inability	to	maintain	it	or	avenge	slanderous	and	calumnious	assaults	on	it	could	have	dire	repercussions.43		Maintaining	honour	was	always	a	challenge	in	the	Old	Regime,	but	the	breakdown	of	policing	institutions	in	1789,	competing	views	on	how	to	deal	with	calumny,	and	the	advent	of	civil	equality	(which	disrupted	hierarchical	patterns	of	esteem	and	deference)	greatly	complicated	matters.	As	political	participation	in	the	new	regime	expanded,	honour	became	all	the	more	important.	For	calumniated	representatives	and	officials,	the	honour	of	their	constituents	was	often	seen	to	be	at	stake,	and	the	failure	of	authorities	to	avenge	calumnious	attacks	was	taken	to	be	a	sign	of	weakness.	Thomas	Paine,	theorist	of	‘the	rights	of	man’	and	deputy	to	the	French	National	Convention	in	spring	1793,	believed	that	calumny	was	one	of	the	greatest	threats	to	the	new	regime.		In	a	letter	to	Georges-Jacques	Danton	in	May	1793,	just	weeks	before	the	purge	of	the	Girondins	(whom	sans-culottes	militants	denounced	as	calumniators	of	Paris),	Paine	explained:	‘The	departments	did	not	send	their	deputies	to	Paris	to	be	insulted,	and	every	insult	shown	to	them	is	an	insult	to	the	departments	that	elected	and	sent	them.’44			 A	central	paradox	of	the	Revolution,	then,	was	its	simultaneous	commitment	to	the	freedom	of	expression	and	its	obsessions	with	punishing	calumniators.	Weak-state	conditions	deprived	individuals	and	groups	who	believed	themselves	to	be	slandered	of	the	means	to	seek	redress.	Between	1789																																																									42	This	section	is	drawn	from	Charles	Walton,	Policing	Public	Opinion	in	the	
French	Revolution:	The	Culture	of	Calumny	and	the	Problem	of	Free	Speech	(New	York,	2009).	43	There	are	many	studies	of	honour	in	the	Old	Regime.	See	especially,	David	Garrioch,	Neighborhood	and	Community	in	Paris,	1740-1790	(Cambridge,	1986).	For	its	importance	for	access	to	credit,	see	Clare	Haru	Crowston,	Credit,	Fashion,	
Sex:	Economies	of	Regard	in	Old	Regime	France	(Durham,	NC,	2013).	44	For	sans-culotte	denunciations	of	the	Girondins	as	calumniators,	see	Archives	nationales,	F7	4432,	cited	in	[Louis]	Mortimer-Ternaux,	Histoire	de	la	terreur,	3rd	edition	(Paris,	1869),	7:	310,	n.	1.		
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and	1791,	censorship	was	abolished,	the	old	courts	broke	down	and	new	courts	were	not	yet	functional.	Although	the	National	Assembly	recognized	the	high	speech	crime	of	‘lèse-nation’	(the	nationalised	version	of	‘lèse-majesté’)	as	early	as	July	1789	and	had	created	a	police	committee	to	investigate	such	crimes,	they	failed	to	define	the	actual	nature	of	such	speech	crimes	clearly,	and	this	absence	in	the	legislation	generated	a	climate	of	political	frustration.	Jacques	Brissot,	a	leading	journalist	and	(in	the	early	stages	of	the	Revolution)	radical	leader,	summed	up	the	matter	concisely	in	an	issue	of	his	Patriote	français	in	1790:	‘To	punish	calumny	without	violating	the	freedom	of	the	press	is	the	most	difficult	problem	to	resolve	in	politics.’45	To	be	sure,	the	culture	of	calumny	poisoned	revolutionary	politics	on	all	levels,	but	the	clubs	were	central	in	spreading	it	and	in	spreading	obsessions	with	it.	With	their	networks	and	armies	of	writers	and	journalists,	they	calumniated	relentlessly	yet	were	indefatigable	in	denouncing	calumny.	They	orchestrated	elaborate	libel	campaigns	(although,	so,	too,	did	the	monarchy,	the	Church	and	various	factions	and	committees	of	the	National	Assembly),	even	as	they	sent	a	constant	stream	of	denunciations	of	lèse-nation	speech	crimes	to	the	Constituent	Assembly’s	police	committee,	the	comité	des	recherches,	insisting	on	punishment.	Clubbists	hardly	needed	to	understand	the	fine	points	of	Rousseau’s	‘general	will’	to	denounce	‘enemies	of	the	Revolution’.	The	Old	Regime	had	bequeathed	a	rich	legacy	of	calumniating.	It	did	not,	however,	bequeath	the	legal	and	institutional	mechanisms	for	dealing	with	such	offenses.	Civil	equality	rendered	the	laws	and	institutions	that	had	regulated	honour	in	a	hierarchical	world	irrelevant.	Yet,	honour	remained	important	and	attacks	on	it,	which	had	always	been	a	means	of	pursuing	social	and	political	competition,	were	still	considered	egregious	offences.			 Calumny,	unchecked	by	a	weak	state,	poisoned	relations	between	and	within	clubs.	No	sooner	had	the	Société	de	la	Révolution	(the	future	Jacobin	Club)	formed	in	November	1789	than	it	became	the	target	of	calumnious	attacks.	Royalists	spread	the	rumour	that	Jacobins	were	holding	nocturnal	meetings	to	
																																																								45	Jacques	Pierre	Brissot,	Le	Patriote	français	(Paris),	10	August	1790.	
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plan	a	regicide.46	Apparently,	these	rumours	worried	Jacobins	enough	that	they	chose	to	publicize	their	meetings.	(They	did	not,	however,	open	their	meetings	to	the	public	until	October	1791.)	By	mid	1790,	the	Jacobins	and	Monarchiens	repeatedly	denounced	each	other’s	‘calumny’	in	the	National	Assembly.	Legislation	regulating	slander	was	proposed	on	several	occasions	that	year	but	was	voted	down	by	narrow	margins	or	repealed	shortly	after	its	passage.		As	calumny	spiralled,	the	Revolution	radicalised.	Politics	became	a	kind	of	pressure	cooker	in	which	outrage	and	accumulated	grudges	fuelled	factionalism,	at	first	between	Jacobins	and	royalists,	subsequently	among	Jacobins	themselves.	In	a	pamphlet	entitled	Discourse	on	the	influence	of	calumny	on	the	Revolution	of	October	1792,	Robespierre	denounced	Roland’s	propaganda	bureau	for	spreading	calumnies	against	the	club,	from	which	he	(Roland)	would	soon	be	expelled.	‘What	will	you	say’,	the	Incorruptible	asked	his	readers,	‘when	I	demonstrate	that	there	now	exists	a	coalition	of	virtuous	patriots	[ironic	reference	to	Roland],	of	austere	republicans	who	are	perfecting	the	criminal	policies	of	Lafayette	[who	had	defected	to	Austria]	and	his	allies?’47	He	predicted	that	prisons	would	soon	be	filled	with	true	patriots,	like	himself,	under	the	government	of	the	tyrannical	Girondin	ministers.	For	their	part,	Brissot,	Roland	and	their	allies	had	been	slandering	the	robespierristes	since	the	spring,	when	Robespierre	opposed	their	(successful)	efforts	to	persuade	the	National	Assembly	to	declare	war	against	Austria.	During	that	time,	Brissot	insinuated	in	a	published	speech	to	the	National	Assembly	that	Robespierre	was	in	the	pay	of	the	monarchy.	Moreover,	one	of	the	titles	that	Roland’s	propaganda	bureau	spread	to	the	provincial	clubs	in	the	fall	was	entitled,	‘To	Maximilien	Robespierre	and	to	his	royalists’.		To	be	sure,	the	clubs	were	not	the	only	political	forces	in	the	early	Revolution	to	be	obsessed	with	calumny.	So,	too,	was	the	monarchy.	Majesty	demanded	esteem	and	deference,	but	the	proliferation	of	calumny	after	the	collapse	of	censorship	and	the	freeing	of	the	presses	deprived	the	king	of	the	respect	he	believed	was	due	to	him.	It	may	well	have	contributed	to	his	attempt																																																									46	F.	A.	Aulard,	‘Le	Club	des	Jacobins	sous	la	monarchie’,	La	Révolution	française	22:	2	(1892),	111.	47	Discours	de	Maximilien	Robespierre	sur	l’influence	de	la	calomnie	sur	la	
Révolution	(Paris,	28	October	1792),	17.		
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to	flee	France.	On	the	eve	of	his	attempted	flight,	he	imprudently	left	a	note	in	the	Tuileries	Palace,	deploring	‘the	thousands	of	calumniating	newspapers	and	pamphlets’	of	rebels	who	‘labour	to	present	the	monarchy	under	the	most	false	and	odious	colours.’	Upon	his	return,	he	enumerated	reasons	for	trying	to	flee,	among	them,	‘the	insults	that	have	gone	unpunished.’48	Yet,	the	monarchy	was	hardly	an	innocent	bystander.	The	seizure	of	the	king’s	private	papers	after	his	fall	in	August	1792	revealed	evidence	of	his	use	of	the	civil	list	to	pay	for	libels	against	revolutionaries.				 During	the	Terror,	the	Convention	finally	enacted	legislation	against	calumny.	By	that	time,	obsessions	with	it	and	accumulated	grudges	had	reached	a	point	that	made	moderate	solutions	unlikely.	The	Law	of	Suspects	(17	September	1793)	targeted	those	who	‘by	their	conduct,	relations,	words,	or	writings	show	themselves	to	be	the	partisans	of	tyranny	and	federalism	and	the	enemies	of	freedom.’		The	Law	of	22	Prairial	Year	II	(10	June	1794),	passed	just	as	the	Terror	was	ratcheting	up	for	its	final	lethal	phase,	went	still	further.	It	imposed	death	on	anyone	found	guilty	of	‘disparaging	the	National	Convention	and	the	republican	government’,	‘calumniating	patriotism’,	‘spreading	false	news’,	‘misleading	public	opinion’,	‘corrupting	the	public	conscience’	and	‘impairing	the	energy	and	purity	of	revolutionary	and	republican	principles.’49	The	ex-noble	and	revolutionary	writer	Louis-François	Ferrières	Sauveboeuf	defended	these	measures:	‘No	law	would	dare	circumscribe	the	freedom	of	the	press;	it	is	an	arm	that	belongs	to	all	citizens;	but	is	it	not	necessary	to	punish	those	who	use	this	arm	to	assassinate	others,	in	so	far	as	an	honest	man	puts	his	reputation	before	his	life?’50		 	
Conclusion	Clearly	circumstances	mattered	in	factionalising	the	clubs	of	the	French	Revolution.	The	flight	of	the	king	in	1791	and	the	war	in	1792	polarised	the																																																									48	John	Hall	Stewart,	A	Documentary	Survey	of	the	French	Revolution	(New	York,	1951)	and	Timoth	Tackett,	When	the	King	Took	Flight	(Cambridge	Mass.,	2003),	41-45.	49	Moniteur,	20:	264,	24	Prairial,	Year	II	(June	12,	1794),	697.	50	Ferrières	Sauveboeuf,	Réflexions	politiques	sur	le	gouvernement	
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Jacobin	Club	in	Paris,	and	the	factionalism	produced	there	spread	to	the	provincial	clubs,	exacerbating	tensions	there.	Controversial	issues	and	events	were	all	the	more	divisive	for	the	clubs	in	that	they	were	debated	in	a	context	in	which	virtually	no	legal	limits	on	speech	existed	–	limits	that	an	honour-based	society	widely	expected	and	repeatedly	demanded	ever	since	the	cahiers	de	
doléances	were	drafted	in	the	spring	of	1789.	Legislators	were	unable	or	unwilling	to	implement	these	desired	limits,	until,	that	is,	the	situation	had	radicalised	to	the	boiling	point	in	1793.		The	absence,	or	weakness,	of	the	state	complicated	efforts	to	meet	other	demands	coming	from	society	as	well.		The	failure	to	collect	taxes	while	guaranteeing	rent	payments	on	investments	in	public	debt	created	conditions	that	led	to	dramatic	measures:	the	expropriations	of	church	property	and	the	imprudent	creation	of	paper	money.	The	clubs	supported	these	measures	and	militated	for	their	enforcement,	but	when	the	measures	proved	to	be	insufficient	and	the	collection	of	taxes	became	imperative,	the	clubs	again	took	the	lead,	albeit	brutally	and	chaotically.		Yet,	even	as	the	clubs	gained	influence	and	power	on	the	local	level,	they	remained	divided	amongst	themselves	over	crucial	issues:	should	they	support	constitutional	monarchy	or	a	republic?	Should	they	support	war	or	peace?	Should	they	educate	society	about	the	benefits	of	the	free	market	or	should	they	militate	for	the	re-regulation	of	the	economy?		These	were	complicated	and	contentious	issues.	In	a	context	of	rampant,	unchecked	calumny	and	heightened	obsessions	with	honour,	they	became	explosive.					Bibliography		Alphonse	Aulard	(ed.),	La	Société	des	Jacobins:	Recueil	de	documents	pour	
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